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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Edith J. Parks (Mrs. Parks) appeals from the April 1, 
1996, order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania denying her a new trial in 
a strict products liability tort action. She asserts that the 
district court erred in instructing the jury as to causation 
and contributory negligence, and in failing to take sufficient 
steps to ensure that defendants complied with discovery 





Mrs. Parks alleges that defective visibility features on 
AlliedSignal's Gradall G-600 excavating machine caused 
her husband's death. Leslie Parks (Mr. Parks) was a general 
laborer for Allegheny Sand, Inc. Mrs. Parks is his widow. 
Mr. Parks was killed while working with the Gradall 
machine, an excavator with two separate cabs that is used 
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for breaking boulders into smaller pieces. One cab is in the 
front, as in an ordinary truck, and is occupied by the driver 
of the vehicle. The second cab, at the rear, is attached to 
and controls the excavating arm. 
 
The second cab, the arm, and the arm's counterweight 
are all in one line. The counterweight keeps the machine 
from tipping when the arm is used off-center. When the 
second cab operator moves the arm as if tracing a circle, 
the machine's entire arm (including the counterweight) 
swings around a central point. The operator sits in the 
middle, swinging along with the arm. The operator's seat 
faces the excavating arm, and the counterweight swings out 
behind his back. The cab has no mirrors, so the operator 
has no view to the area behind him and only limited side 
visibility while operating the controls. 
 
On the morning of the accident, Mr. Parks and two co- 
workers, at the direction of their supervisor, endeavored to 
break some blocks of carbon. The machine's regular shovel 
had been replaced by Mr. Parks' employer with a chipper 
attachment used for carbon-breaking. From outside the 
machine, Mr. Parks directed his co-workers, who occupied 
the two cabs and controlled the truck. Alan McMunn, 
sitting in the front cab, drove the machine to the back of a 
shed where the carbon was stored. William Kline, in the 
second cab, operated the excavator arm and boom. 
 
Mr. Parks walked to the back of the shed. As McMunn 
pulled the machine into the shed, Mr. Parks directed him. 
Mr. Parks told Kline to swing the boom to the left. The 
instruction sent the excavating arm's counterweight on a 
collision course with Mr. Parks. Mr. Parks was pressed 
between the counterweight and the wall, causing his death. 
 
Mrs. Parks sought to hold AlliedSignal liable on the 
theory that it failed to install a rear-view mirror or 
alternative safety device on the Gradall machine. She 
alleged that this omission made the product "unreasonably 
dangerous" because it caused the vision of the second cab's 
operator to be needlessly circumscribed. Over objections by 
Mrs. Parks, the district court admitted evidence concerning 
Mr. Parks' conduct immediately prior to his death. The 
district court refused to charge the jury that Mr. Parks' 
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conduct could be viewed as a legal cause of his death only 
if it were unforeseeable. 
 
The jury found that the product was indeed defective, but 
nevertheless returned a verdict for the manufacturer. The 
verdict was presumably based on the finding of the jury 
that the defect was not "a substantial factor" in causing the 
death. Parks' motion for a new trial was denied. Mrs. Parks 
argues that the district court erred when it failed to charge 
the jury that if Mr. Parks' conduct were foreseeable, such 
conduct could not have broken any chain of causation 
linking the alleged defect to his death. 
 
In addition, during the trial Mrs. Parks sought to compel 
disclosure of information that she had requested during 
pre-trial discovery, but which allegedly had not been 
divulged. That information concerned other accidents 
involving similar machines and the placement of mirrors on 
those machines. The district court granted the motion to 
compel,1 but the record on appeal raises serious questions 





The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (1993), diversity of citizenship. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(1993). Concerning the propriety of the charge delivered to 
the jury, our standard of review is plenary, as we are 
reviewing whether the district court erred in formulating a 
legal precept. See Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 370 
(3d Cir. 1994)(citing Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 
462 (3d Cir. 1993)(citing Rotondo v. Keene Corp, 956 F.2d 
436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992))). We review the supervision of 
discovery by the district court for abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. 27.93 Acres of Land, 924 F.2d 506, 510 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 134 
(3d Cir. 1983). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. App. at 528-531. 
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III. 
 
We initially review two key questions raised on this 
appeal. First, what must a plaintiff show in order to recover 
in a strict products liability tort action under Pennsylvania 
law, which incorporates section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts? Second, having admitted evidence of a 
decedent's conduct immediately before an accident, what 
must a district court do to fulfill its obligation to explain to 
a jury the appropriate use of such information? 
 
A. Section 402A 
 
Section 402A, which was adopted by the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania in Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 
1966), "imposes strict liability for injuries caused by 
defective product design."2 Pacheco v. Coats Co., Inc., 26 
F.3d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 1994)(citing Lewis v. Coffing Hoist 
Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 592 (Pa. 1987)). See 
also Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 
(Pa. 1995)(acknowledging Pennsylvania's adoption of 
section 402A). In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, "Section 402A . . . requires only proof that a product 
was sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 402A provides: 
 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
 
 (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and 
 
 (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
 
 (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale of his product, and 
 
 (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into contractual relations with the seller. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
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to the user or consumer, and that the defect was the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." Walton v. Avco 
Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 458 (Pa. 1992). "Manufacturers are 
held as guarantors upon a finding of defect and causation." 
Id. at 462. 
 
In order to prevail in a section 402A action, the plaintiff 
must show that a product is "unreasonably dangerous to 
intended users for its intended use." Pacheco, 26 F.3d at 
422 (emphasis omitted). In interpreting the phrase 
"intended use", we have held that "the intended use of a 
product `includes all those [uses] which are reasonably 
foreseeable to the seller.' " Id. (quoting Sheldon v. West 
Bend Equip. Corp., 718 F.2d 603, 608 (3d Cir. 
1983)(alteration added)). Under the strict liability test, 
therefore, a defendant is liable for causing injury to a 
person who was behaving in a foreseeable manner. This 
principle is reflected in the jury instruction recommended 
by Pennsylvania's Committee for Proposed Standard Jury 
Instructions, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
endorsed in Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc.: 
 
The product must . . . be provided with every element 
necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use, and 
without any condition that makes it unsafe for [its 
intended] use. If you find that the product, at the time 
it left the defendant's control, lacked any element 
necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use or 
contained any condition that made it unsafe for[its 
intended] use, then the product was defective, and the 
defendant is liable for all harm caused by such defect. 
 
391 A.2d 1020, 1027 n.12 (Pa. 1978). See also Lewis v. 





Section 402A liability cannot be found if, at the time of 
the accident, the product was being used in an 
unforeseeable manner. The requirement of foreseeability 
therefore enables strict liability to exist without 
transforming manufacturers into absolute insurers of their 
products. The importance of this rule has been repeatedly 
 
                                6 
demonstrated in the courts. In Sheldon, 718 F.2d at 608, 
we held that "the district court[ ][should not] fail[ ] to 
instruct the jury to the effect that the intended use of a 
product includes any use which is reasonably foreseeable 
to the seller." See also Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259, 
1263 (3d Cir. 1977)(quoting Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima- 
Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914, 921 n.13 (Pa. 
1974))("whether a particular use of a product is abnormal 
depends on whether the use was reasonably foreseeable by 
the seller."). In Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, 527 A.2d 1012, 
1019 (Pa. Super. 1987), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
reversed a trial court on the grounds that "the established 
rule of law . . . requires consideration of `foreseeability' " in 
the jury instruction in a strict products liability action. 
 
The concept of foreseeability is relevant to strict products 
liability cases for the purpose of determining whether the 
use that was made of a product at the time of the accident 
was one that the manufacturer could have reasonably 
anticipated. See Schell, 567 F.2d at 1263. In order to 
prevail in a section 402A products liability action, then, the 
plaintiff must show that: (1) a product defect (2) caused a 
harm (3) while the product was being used in a foreseeable 
manner. 
 
As the Pennsylvania Superior Court held in Sweitzer v. 
Dempster Sys., 539 A.2d 880, 882 (Pa. Super. 1988)(citing 
Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 
1974)(emphasis added)): 
 
The role of foreseeability in a product liability case is 
consistent with the broad and sound social policy 
underlying § 402A; that is, as between an innocent 
user of a product and a manufacturer or seller who is 
engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling a 
product, risk of loss for injuries resulting from the use 
of a defective product shall be borne by the 
manufacturer and/or seller. 
 
Of course, a defect may produce manufacturer liability in a 
given case only when the harm caused is of the type 
threatened by the defect. 
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2. "Substantial Factor" Causation as it Relates to 
Foreseeability 
 
In determining how the elements of foreseeability and 
causation may properly be demonstrated in the instant 
case, we are again guided by Pennsylvania law. When 
addressing causation, Pennsylvania has rejected the "but 
for" test and adopted the "substantial factor" test as 
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431, which 
provides: 
 
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm 
to another if: (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law 
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner 
in which his negligence resulted in the harm. 
 
See Trude v. Martin, 660 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. Super. 
1995)(citing Whitner v. Von Hintz, 263 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1970)). 
 
The courts of other states following the Restatement have 
defined a "substantial factor" as one that is not "merely 
negligible." ACandS v. Asner, 686 A.2d 250, 260 (Md. 
1996). "Stated differently, `[l]iability attaches not only to the 
dominating cause but also to any cause which constitutes 
at any event a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury.' " Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., 673 A.2d 
847, 853 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996)(quoting Peer v. City 
of Newark, 176 A.2d 249 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1961)(emphasis added)). The substantial factor test has 
replaced the "but for" causation test in strict liability 
contexts precisely because in design defect cases it is 
typically a matter of speculation whether the presence of a 
safety device would, in a given instance, have actually 
prevented a harm. See Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 
P.2d 428, 433 (Alaska 1983)(stating that "but for" causation 
jury instruction was improper in manufacturer's design 
defect case), overruled on other grounds, Williford v. L.J. 
Carr Invs., Inc., 783 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1989). 
 
Our review of Pennsylvania law dictates that a plaintiff's 
conduct may be introduced to undermine a plaintiff's claim 
that the defect caused his accident only insofar as the 
plaintiff's conduct was unforeseeable to the defendant, 
even where the plaintiff played some part in setting the 
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accident in motion. Evidence concerning a decedent's 
possible role in bringing about his or her own death is 
admissible only to support defendant's claim that the 
conduct was so "extraordinary" or "[un]foreseeable" that it 
would be unjust to hold the defendant liable for the harm. 
See. e.g., Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1074 
(3d Cir. 1979). When courts admit such testimony, they 
must elucidate the limited permissible uses of that 
evidence, as it is highly susceptible to misinterpretation by 
the jury. 
 
In determining causation, therefore, the task of the jury 
is not simply to determine whether the plaintiff played a 
part in causing the accident. Rather, the threshold question 
is whether the plaintiff's actions were foreseeable. As noted 
above, the manufacturer is responsible for making the 
product safe for all foreseeable uses. Decorative Precast 
Stone Erectors, Inc. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 493 F. Supp. 555, 
557 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, 642 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1981), 
informs us that under Pennsylvania products liability law, 
if both a manufacturer's defect and a plaintiff's conduct are 
found to be proximate causes, the plaintiff will recover 
unless the defendant meets the burden of proving that 
plaintiff's conduct was so unforeseeable as to constitute a 
superseding cause. See infra, Sec. III.A.3. If foreseeable, the 
jury must find for the plaintiff unless it finds that the defect 
did not play even a substantial, or more than negligible, 
role in causing the plaintiff's injury. In Schell, 567 F.2d at 
1263 (citing Barkewitch v. Billinger, 247 A.2d 603, 605)(Pa. 
1968)), we explained that recovery is allowed where the 
absence of a safety device caused an injury of the type that 
could be expected from the foreseeable use of the product.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The dissent writes that 
 
The result the majority reaches does not take into account the 
distinction in Pennsylvania law between treatment of a plaintiff's 
negligence which is the sole cause of the injury and a plaintiff's 
negligence which combines with the defect in the product to cause 
the injury. Negligence of the second kind could defeat the claim only 
if it is . . . unforeseeable. 
 
Dissent at 29. The instant case is precisely of the second type: the jury 
explicitly answered yes to the question, "Was the Gradall excavator 
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The element of causation, while required, is not the 
primary focus of section 402A cases. Causation may be 
shown by process of elimination or circumstantial evidence. 
In cases dealing with product malfunction, for instance, 
Pennsylvania appellate courts have consistently reversed 
trial courts for not sending to the jury cases in which 
causation had not been directly demonstrated. See, e.g., 
Ducko v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 639 A.2d 1204 (Pa. Super. 
1994); Agostino v. Rockwell Mfg. Corp., 345 A.2d 735 (Pa. 
Super. 1975); Burchill v. Kearney-Nat'l Corp. v. 
Pennsylvania, 468 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1972). Similarly, in 
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 257 A.2d 676, 680 (Pa. 
Super. 1969) overruled on other grounds, REM Coal Co. v. 
Clark Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128, 134 (Pa. Super. 1989),4 the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court stated: 
 
The evidentiary requirements of negligence law demand 
proof that injury is proximately caused by a specific 
defect in design or construction because liability hinges 
upon whether the accident could have been avoided by 
the exercise of reasonable care. In contrast, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
defective at the time it was manufactured and sold?" App. at 432. The 
machine's defect was impaired visibility of precisely the area in which 
the accident occurred. In accordance with the dissent's above 
description, the manufacturer of the defective product in this case 
should be held liable unless the plaintiff's actions were unforeseeable. 
See also the criticism of Foley articulated in Dillinger, discussed infra in 
this opinion at 14-16. The dissent points out that the jury responded 
"no" to the question, "Was the defect in the excavator a substantial 
factor in bringing about Mr. Parks' death?" Dissent at 32. But our 
holding today is that the jury instructions did not properly illuminate, 
inter alia, what constitutes a substantial factor in a strict products 
liability action, so this question was not adequately explained to the jury. 
Having found that the Gradall machine was defective, the jury could 
have found that the defect was not a substantial factor in causing 
plaintiff's injury only if it found that had the mirror been in place, the 
driver would not have glanced into it before backing. Only in this sense 
does causation remain a factor susceptible to dispute. As this is a strict 
products liability action, the plaintiff's foreseeable actions remain 
immaterial to the question of causation. 
 
4. We note that the dissent does not address these cases. 
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concern of both section 402A and warranty law is with 
the fitness of the product. 
 
The de-emphasis of causation is a natural corollary of the 
distinction between negligence and strict products liability. 
In strict products liability, the focus is on whether the 
product was sold in an unreasonably dangerous condition 
for reasonably foreseeable uses. See Carpenter v. Koehring 
Co., 391 F. Supp. 206, 210-211 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 527 
F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1976). In negligence, by contrast, the 
focus is on whether a duty of care was breached. See 
Kuisis, 319 A.2d at 920. In either negligence or strict 
products liability, proximate cause defines "such limits on 
recovery as are economically and socially desirable." Klages 
v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d 304, 313 (240 
Pa. Super. 1976). In the products liability area, 
Pennsylvania has determined that it is economically and 
socially desirable to hold manufacturers liable for accidents 
caused by their defective products, without introducing 
negligence concepts of comparative fault that would weigh 
the manufacturer's negligent conduct against that of the 
injured product user. See Walton, 610 A.2d at 462. See also 
infra, Sec. III.A.4. 
 
3. Superseding or Intervening Cause 
 
The test for what constitutes a superseding cause reflects 
the de-emphasis of causation in strict products liability 
litigation. Klages explains that a reasonably foreseeable 
intervening act cannot "satisfy the requirements of a 
superseding cause."5 367 A.2d at 313. In a section 402A 
strict liability tort claim such as that in the instant case, "a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 defines superseding cause as 
"an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents 
the actor from being liable for harm to another which by its antecedent 
negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." Superseding cause 
(and the related intervening cause, defined in section 441) is a 
comparative negligence concept, whereby an actor's liability is 
diminished due to the injured party's own negligence. In order to be 
compatible with strict products liability, the concept must be 
substantially narrowed to eliminate any foreseeable conduct of the 
injured party. 
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negligent intervening act, to relieve defendant of 
accountability, must be . . . `so extraordinary as not to have 
been reasonably foreseeable.' " Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's and 
Co., 481 F.2d 940, 945 (3d Cir. 1973)(quoting Dorsey v. 
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1971)(quoting 
Wilson v. American Chain and Cable Co., 364 F.3d 558, 562 
(3d Cir. 1966))). Similarly, in Baker v. Outboard Marine 
Corp., 595 F.2d 176, 182 (3d. Cir. 1979), we held that the 
intervening negligence of a third party could serve as a 
superseding cause of injuries to shield defendant 
manufacturer from liability to plaintiff only if it were "so 
extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable." 
Id. at 182 (quoting Eshbach, 481 F.2d at 945). See also 
Williford, 783 P.2d at 237 (act may constitute superseding 
cause only if, in addition to being unforeseeable by 
defendant, it was highly extraordinary). 
 
In short, even if an intervening but foreseeable action is 
responsible for the major share of a strict products liability 
injury, that action cannot ordinarily be held to be the legal 
cause of the injury. Instead, it is removed from the picture, 
and liability attaches to the remaining causal actor or 
actors. Here, if the possibility of a person standing in the 
path of the Gradall is found to be foreseeable or ordinary, 
Mr. Parks' actions cannot legally be viewed as disrupting or 
otherwise playing a part in the causal chain that 
culminated in his death. 
 
4. Rejection of Comparative Fault 
 
The above-described approaches to foreseeability, 
causation, and superseding cause in Pennsylvania strict 
products liability cases are compelled by Pennsylvania's 
rejection of comparative fault. Of particular relevance to the 
instant case, Walton explained that 
 
[The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has continually 
fortified the theoretical dam between the notions of 
negligence and strict "no fault" liability. It would serve 
only to muddy the waters to introduce comparative fault 
into an action based solely on strict liability. 
 
610 A.2d at 462 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). It has 
been noted by numerous courts that "[t]he Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court, perhaps more than any other state 
appellate court in the nation, has been emphatic in 
divorcing negligence concepts from product-liability 
doctrine." Kern v. Nissan Indus. Equip. Co., 801 F. Supp. 
1438, 1440 (M.D. Pa. 1992)(quoting Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 
578 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently explained its 
reasons for not extending the defense of comparative 
negligence to a strict products liability action: 
 
Our position is not based solely on the problem of the 
conceptual confusion that would ensue should 
negligence and strict liability concepts be commingled, 
although that concern is not negligible. Rather, we 
think that the underlying purpose of strict product 
liability is undermined by introducing negligence 
concepts into it. Strict product liability is premised on 
the concept of . . . liability for casting a defective 
product into the stream of commerce. 
 
 The deterrent effect of imposing strict product 
liability standards would be weakened were we to allow 
actions based upon it to be defeated, or recoveries 
reduced by negligence concepts. 
 
Kimco Dev. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 603, 
606-607 (Pa. 1993)(emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, in McCown v. Int'l Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381 
(Pa. 1975), the plaintiff, as here, was injured by an 
industrial vehicle. According to the plaintiff, the machine's 
design was defective and caused his injuries. The defendant 
argued that plaintiff's contributory negligence should have 
been considered either to reduce the plaintiff's permissible 
recovery or as a defense to liability. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that it would be 
unwise to "create a system of comparative assessment of 
damages for 402A actions." Id. at 382. 
 
Pennsylvania's wish to avoid "muddy[ing] the waters" 
dictates that in discussing causation, the comparative fault 
of the parties involved is immaterial. Rather, the focus is 
again on whether the activity engaged in by the plaintiff 
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was foreseeable. If foreseeable, and the defect is found to 
have been a cause of the injury, the plaintiff's actions 
cannot preclude defendant liability. Any other approach 
would require weighing negligence or lack of care, which 
would inject comparative fault into strict products liability. 
 
In Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 
1992), which undertook an extensive survey of 
Pennsylvania products liability law, the trial court's final 
charge expressly permitted the jury to consider plaintiff's 
alleged negligence when determining whether defendant's 
product caused his injuries: "The defendant denies that it 
is liable for plaintiff's injuries. Defendant contends that the 
773 truck was not defectively designed, and that any 
injuries sustained by plaintiff were caused by the acts of 
plaintiff himself." 959 F.2d at 440. In Dillinger, we reversed, 
disapproving this jury charge because we found that it 
"effectively framed the issue as one of contributory 
negligence . . . ." Id. at 440 n.18. The defendant "point[ed] 
to a line of cases which suggest[ ] that, although evidence 
of a plaintiff's contributory negligence is ordinarily 
inadmissible, it is admissible to rebut the `causation' prong 
of a products liability claim." Id. at 441. 
 
We rejected the defendant's arguments and found the 
line of cases cited to be "in some instances[irreconcilable] 
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's declarations on this 
subject." Id. at 441. We also distinguished that line of cases 
from the case then before us, by explaining that in the 
cases cited by the defendant, "the plaintiff's conduct [had] 
actively contributed to the cause of the accident, [rather 
than] merely [failing] to prevent the accident attributable to 
the defect." Id. at 442. We reasoned in Dillinger that the 
evidence of the plaintiff's conduct was especially 
inadmissible when the conduct was "merely insufficient to 
prevent the accident attributable to the defect." Id. In 
Dillinger, therefore, we left open the question of whether a 
different result would obtain where the plaintiff's conduct 
had been more than "merely insufficient to prevent the 
accident attributable to the defect." Id. 
 
The argument of the defense in the instant case--that a 
plaintiff's foreseeable conduct can break the causal chain 
set in motion by a product defect--was championed in 
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Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 523 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. 1987). 
But as we stated in Dillinger and reiterate today, we believe 
that case is inconsistent with Pennsylvania strict products 
liability law. Dillinger, 959 F.2d at 443. In Foley, the 
Superior Court endorsed the admission of evidence of a 
plaintiff's contributory negligence in a section 402A suit. 
There, as here, the plaintiff was struck by an industrial 
vehicle when the operator failed to notice him. The plaintiff 
alleged that the manufacturer had defectively designed the 
vehicle in that, inter alia, the driver's view was improperly 
obstructed. The Superior court stated that "negligen[t] 
conduct is admissible where it is relevant to establish 
causation[,]" and plaintiff's allegedly negligent behavior is 
admissible for this purpose. Foley, 523 A.2d at 393. 
Nonetheless, we explained in Dillinger that 
 
there is no meaningful way to reconcile the view that a 
plaintiff's negligence of the type involved in Foley 
should be admitted to undercut causation with the 
Supreme Court's prohibition of the introduction of a 
plaintiff's negligence to defeat liability. . . . In Foley, 
the plaintiff did not observe the oncoming forklift and 
did not move out of its way. Because the driver 
similarly had not noticed the plaintiff, the driver 
crashed into him. Although the plaintiff contended that 
the design of the forklift . . . was defective because, in 
part, . . . [of the] obstructed . . . view, the court 
permitted the defendant to introduce evidence of the 
plaintiff's inattention because the accident could have 
been avoided if the plaintiff had not acted negligently. 
. . . [T]here is no principled reason to prohibit evidence 
of the plaintiff's negligence in McCown but permit 
evidence of an almost identical character in Foley. 
 
959 F.2d at 443-44. The fact that the plaintiff in Foley 
could have moved out of the way does not mean that Foley 
caused the accident, and that the driver (who also could 
have moved out of the way) did not cause the accident. 
Obstructed vision was a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries in Foley; no meaningful distinction can be made 
between the operator's and the plaintiff's roles in causing 
the accident. 
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In Dillinger, although we did not endorse as dispositive 
the distinction between plaintiffs who "set [their] accident[s] 
in motion" and those who merely fail to stop them, we 
limited our holding to cases in which the plaintiff merely 
failed to stop his injury from being caused by a product 
defect. 959 F.2d at 444. This distinction is somewhat 
artificial, as plaintiff's conduct will often be susceptible to 
characterization in either category. But assuming that in 
directing the operator to swing the boom, Mr. Parks "set the 
accident in motion," we will now address the question of 
the permissible uses of evidence of plaintiff's conduct 
where such conduct has actively "set the accident in 
motion." Id. 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion of the permissible uses 
of plaintiff's conduct evidence in section 402A actions, we 
find that the evidence of Mr. Parks' actions preceding his 
death were appropriate for the jury to consider only if they 
decided that those actions were not reasonably foreseeable 
or were otherwise extraordinary. In failing to put that test 
to the jury, the district court gave the impression that the 
jury's function was to assess the relative contributions of 
Mr. Parks and the machine's defect in causing Mr. Parks' 
death. As a matter of law, however, strict products liability 
demands that a plaintiff's foreseeable actions can never 
displace manufacturer liability when a product defect was 
a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury. 
 
B. Jury Instructions 
 
When reviewing the sufficiency of jury instructions, our 
task is to determine whether the "instruction was capable 
of confusing and thereby misleading the jury." Bennis v. 
Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d. Cir. 1987)(quoting United 
States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d 
Cir. 1984)). Defendants contend that the district court's 
instructions were sufficient. But the several pages of 
sometimes contradictory instructions nowhere state that 
the jury must not consider the foreseeable or ordinary uses 
of a product to be a legal cause of an accident, in the sense 
that foreseeable actions cannot limit a defendant's liability. 
The actions of Mr. Parks may be weighed in the causation 
calculation only if the jury finds them to have been 
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unforeseeable or extraordinary. Omission of this 
requirement is a clear violation of our holding in Sheldon, 
718 F.2d at 608 ("On remand . . . the district court should 
. . . charge the jury that the intended use of a product 
includes all those [uses] which are reasonably foreseeable 
to the seller."). 
 
Furthermore, our holding in Baker demonstrates that 
instructions that contain some characterizations of the law 
that are accurate will nonetheless be unacceptably tainted 
by the presence of other, misleading comments: 
 
The district court stated in its opinion denying the new 
trial motion that its instruction that there may be more 
than one proximate cause, and that Outboard would 
be liable if a defect [were] "[a] proximate cause," 
adequately informed the jury that it could find[the 
defendant] to be negligent, and further find her 
negligence to be . . . `a' proximate cause[,] was greatly 
diminished [by other instructions]. . . . .[T]he case will 
be remanded for a new trial. 
 
Baker, 595 F.2d 176, 184 (citation omitted). 
 
In Eshbach, we reversed the district court because it 
failed to either "remove the question of [third-party] 
negligence entirely from the case or, if it was to be 
considered, to instruct the jury as to the limits of its 
application." 481 F.2d at 945. Strict liability means that an 
entity is liable for all accidents caused unless they are 
extraordinary or unforeseeable, regardless of the level of 
vigilance demonstrated by others. 
 
In the present case, the district court's instructions to 
the jury spread over several pages of the transcript, and the 
summary of the instructions offered at the end misstated 
the appropriate analysis. The district court accurately 
stated, 
 
if you find that a defect in a product was a substantial 
factor in bringing about harm, the manufacturer 
and/or seller of the product is responsible for that 
harm even though you may have found that there were 
other substantial factors as well as a defect in bringing 
about the harm. 
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App. at 414-15. But the district court impermissibly 
blurred the matter in summarizing the instructions: 
 
 If you determine that the defendants manufactured 
and sold the excavator lacking an element necessary to 
make it safe for its intended use and that the lack of 
this element or elements was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the incident which resulted in Mr. 
Parks' death, then you will find that the defendants are 
liable to the plaintiff. Otherwise, you will find in favor 
of the defendants. Likewise, your verdict will be for 
defendants if you find that either the conduct of the 
decedent's employer . . . was a legal cause of the 
accident or if you find that the conduct of Mr. Parks 
himself or the conduct of his co-workers was also a 
legal cause of the accident and that the alleged defect 
was not a legal cause of the accident. 
 
 So, in order to find for the defendants, you must find 
that the alleged defect was not the legal cause of the 
accident. 
 
App. at 418-19 (emphasis added). Here, in concluding, the 
court instructed that the defendant will prevail if "you . . . 
find . . . that the alleged defect was not the legal cause of 
the accident." The use of "the" rather than "a" indicated 
that the legal cause must be predominant, or greater than 
all others, rather than one of several, of varying (albeit 
"substantial") weights. 
 
As noted above, the primary reason that the instruction 
is fatally erroneous is not its particular wording but that it 
failed to require the jury to analyze whether Mr. Parks' 
actions were unforeseeable or extraordinary. If the jury 
found that the actions were neither unforeseeable nor 
extraordinary, it could not have found his actions to be "a 
legal cause" of his injury. Yet in the above-quoted 
instruction, the court indicated that Mr. Parks' conduct 
could be a "legal cause of the accident" without explaining 
that this was true only if the conduct were extraordinary or 
unforeseeable. 
 
The centrality of foreseeability to Pennsylvania strict 
products liability law was recently reaffirmed in Childers v. 
Power Line Equip. Rentals, Inc., 681 A.2d 201, 208-209 (Pa. 
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Super. 1996), which held that evidence of an injured party's 
conduct was properly barred from a strict liability action 
because the defendant had failed to demonstrate that the 
injured party acted in an "unforeseeable," "reckless," 
"extraordinary," or "outrageous" manner. Here, having 
admitted evidence of plaintiff's conduct, the district court is 
obligated firmly to instruct the jury that a plaintiff's 
comparative fault is no defense to defendant liability, and 
should not be weighed against the manufacturer's alleged 




We now shift our focus from the jury instructions at trial 
to the discovery process. It appears that defendants did not 
produce discovery information concerning other similar 
accidents, of which there were at least five. Defendants 
concede that all information on these five other accidents 
came from the investigation conducted by plaintiff, and was 
not disclosed by defendants in discovery. AlliedSignal 
introduced specific information about these accidents only 
at trial, when arguing that evidence of their occurrence 
should be inadmissible. In addition, the record contains 
credible evidence that defendants failed to reveal the 
existence of safety mirrors on comparable machines, 
including the Gradall 880-C. 
 
These apparent discovery abuses did not become evident 
until trial. While we make no definitive assessments as to 
the propriety of defendants' actions, on retrial the district 
court is directed to superintend with care and be confident 
that defendants properly and adequately disclose materials 
to which the plaintiff is rightfully entitled. Specifically, 
discovery orders that the court entered in the original trial, 
and which apparently were not heeded in full, shall be 




For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the district 
court's April 1, 1996, denial of appellants' motion for a new 
trial and remand for a new trial. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join Judge Cowen's opinion. However, I write separately 
to state my understanding of what we hold today, and to 
comment upon the problems I perceive in the approach 
taken by our colleague, Judge Greenberg. In my view, that 
approach opens the door that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court closed in Azzarello v. Black Brothers, Co., 391 A.2d 
1020 (Pa. 1978), and beckons comparative fault to reenter 
discussions of strict liability. Any discussion of strict 
liability must adhere to the policy considerations endemic 
to § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. As we noted 
in Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1992) 
in our discussion of Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 
337 A.2d 893 (1975): 
 
The law of products liability developed in response to 
changing societal concerns over the relationship 
between the consumer and the seller of a product. The 
increasing complexity of the manufacturing and 
distributional process placed upon the injured plaintiff 
a nearly impossible burden of proving negligence 
where, for policy reasons, it was felt that a seller 
should be responsible for injuries caused by defects in 
his products. 
 
959 F.2d at 435 (citation omitted). 
 
Judge Greenberg reads our decision in Dillinger as 
precluding "inject[ion]" of "negligence principles in strict 
liability actions" only in those circumstances where the 
plaintiff's conduct "exacerbated or failed to prevent an 
injury caused by the defect." Dissent at 28. Judge 
Greenberg also states that the law of Pennsylvania does not 
preclude consideration of a plaintiff's conduct where that 
"conduct . . . caused an accident independently of the 
defect in the product." Dissent at 28. However, Judge 
Greenberg over simplifies the range of causes that typically 
lie behind an injury. In most cases (including those relied 
upon by Judge Greenberg) a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that the injury resulted from a combination of 
plaintiff's conduct and the challenged defect. Judge 
Greenberg's analysis would seem to permit the use of 
plaintiff's conduct in these cases. However, I think that 
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neither our previous decision in Dillinger nor our decision 
today allows principles of contributory negligence to govern 
a dispute merely because "plaintiff's conduct set the events 
leading to the accident in motion" as Judge Greenberg 
believes. Dissent at 28. 
 
Judge Greenberg relies upon Bascelli v. Randy, Inc., 488 
A.2d 1110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), and Gallagher v. Ing, 532 
A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) and our discussion of them 
in Dillinger to support his conclusion that we have barred 
evidence of plaintiff's conduct only in situations where that 
conduct exacerbates an injury caused by the defect, or 
failed to prevent an injury caused by it, and not where the 
conduct causes an injury independent of the defect. 
Clearly, one can not be held liable in a strict liability action 
unless the claimed defect actually caused the injury. In 
other words, the defect must have been "a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm." Powell v. Drumheller, 
653 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. 1995), see dissent at 26. However, 
plaintiff's conduct is not relevant to this inquiry simply 
because such conduct may have also contributed to the 
injury. Before plaintiff's conduct can be admitted it must 
be viewed in context with the societal policies that lie 
behind strict liability and that assist in determining 
causation under Dillinger. 
 
In Bascelli, the Pennsylvania Superior Court did hold 
that evidence that the plaintiff had been driving a 
motorcycle 100 miles per hour was relevant to establish 
causation, and could not be excluded merely because it 
also intended to show contributory negligence. 488 A.2d at 
113. However, as we noted in Dillinger, Bascelli no longer 
provides us with guidance. In deciding Bascelli, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court cited Greiner v. 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 
1976) which, as we noted in Dillinger, was decided prior to 
Azzarello, supra, wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
"significantly broadened the scope of liability under § 402A." 
Dillinger, 959 F.2d at 442. In Dillinger we did state the 
following: 
 
Of more significance, the plaintiff's conduct in Bascelli 
actively contributed to the cause of the accident, while 
[plaintiff's] conduct in this case was merely insufficient 
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to prevent the accident attributable to the defect of the 
[product]. Thus, here the evidence was compelling that 
the defect which resulted in the hose damage, rather 
than [plaintiff's] conduct, triggered the accident. 
 
959 F.2d at 442. 
 
That statement, however, is best understood when viewed 
in context with the policy repercussions of ignoring conduct 
which, though foreseeable, is so unreasonable as to not 
justify finding the manufacturer liable even though the 
manufacturer is deemed to be the "guarantor" of its 
products.1 I submit that had Bascelli been exceeding the 
speed limit by only 5 miles an hour rather than rocketing 
through space at 100 miles per hour his conduct would not 
have been relevant to determining if the alleged defect (as 
opposed to his own behavior) was responsible for his loss of 
control. However, his conduct was so outrageous that it 
amounted to assumption of the risk, misuse of the product, 
and highly reckless conduct. In Dillinger we hypothesized 
that all three of those theories continue to be permissible 
defenses in a § 402A proceeding. 959 F.2d at 445-46. I 
believe that absent conduct which is so outrageous as to 
fall into one of those three categories the policy 
considerations that hold a manufacturer liable as a 
guarantor of its product control. However, once the 
plaintiff's conduct becomes so unreasonable and 
extraordinary as to amount to either assumption of the 
risk, misuse of the product, or highly reckless conduct, that 
conduct becomes relevant to causation as society has no 
interest in protecting such plaintiffs from the consequences 
of that kind of irresponsibility. Moreover, it is unjust to 
shift the cost of such injury from the person whose 
outrageous conduct caused it (or contributed to it) to the 




1. As we noted in Dillinger: 
 
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The 
product must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary 
to make it safe for [its intended] use, and without any condition that 
makes it unsafe for [its intended use]. 
 
959 F.2d at 436 (brackets in original). 
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This policy concern is written into the law of strict 
liability through the mechanism of causation. Accordingly, 
we observed in Dillinger: 
 
[t]he. . . issue of causation is raised when the 
plaintiff's action is so reckless that the plaintiff would 
have been injured despite the curing of any alleged 
defect, or is so extraordinary and unforeseeable as to 
constitute a superseding clause. 
 
959 F.2d at 446 (internal quotations omitted) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
In Pennsylvania, products liability law "shift[s] the loss to 
the party who can most easily bear it." Staymates v. ITT 
Holub Industries, 527 A.2d 140, 143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
However, this general policy does not operate where it 
would cause an inappropriate or unjust result. Gallagher v. 
Ing, 532 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (cited by Judge 
Greenberg), is another example of this. There, the 
administratrix of the deceased driver of an automobile sued 
the manufacturer of the automobile alleging that a design 
defect had caused the decedent driver to lose control in a 
fatal car crash. The evidence that was produced at trial 
established that, at the time of the accident, the driver had 
a blood alcohol content of .18 percent. The jury was allowed 
to consider that evidence as it tended to establish that the 
decedent was "unfit to drive a vehicle safely," 532 A.2d at 
1181, and that the intoxication; not the alleged defect, 
caused the accident. The Pennsylvania Superior Court 
noted that such evidence was appropriate, not because it 
established intoxication per se, but because it established 
intoxication to the extent of rendering the decedent unfit to 
drive. The court noted that the defendant had produced 
evidence that the decedent had been drinking scotch for a 
period of approximately 1-1/2 hours before driving his car 
home and that some witnesses had observed that he had 
been "driving at a high rate of speed on a dark, winding 
and hilly road approximately one mile from the scene of the 
accident." Id. at 1182. The manufacturer had also produced 
expert testimony as to the ability of someone with a blood 
alcohol concentration of .18 percent to safely operate a car. 
On appeal the court noted that with a blood alcohol level 
that high, 
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virtually every person, adult or child. . . is markedly 
impaired with respect to . . . judgment, the response 
time, . . . the coordination. . . all of these things are 
progressively and markedly impaired. . . forensic 
toxicologists and everybody else says that this kind of 
a blood alcohol level, a person's likelihood of being 
involved in a fatal accident is over 20 times greater 
than that of a sober person. . . He can still drive.. . 
but not safely. 
 
532 A.2d 1182-3. Accordingly, the evidence was properly 
admitted to show that the decedent was "incapable of 
driving safely and that this was the legal cause of his loss 
of control of the vehicle he was driving." Id. at 1183. 
 
Thus, Gallagher does not support Judge Greenberg's 
position to the extent that might at first appear although he 
correctly notes it as an example of a case where a plaintiff's 
conduct did set the events leading to the accident in 
motion. See dissent at 28. In theory, the conduct in 
Gallagher would have set the events leading to the accident 
in motion had the evidence shown marginal impairment or 
that the driver had exceeded the speed limit by 5 miles per 
hour. Yet, I do not believe that in those situations a jury 
could consider plaintiff's conduct on the issue of causation 
-- even if a manufacturer could show that had the plaintiff 
not been exceeding the speed limit, or not been slightly 
impaired, the particular defect would not have been 
sufficient by itself to cause loss of control. Few among us 
can honestly state that he or she has never exceeded a 
posted speed limit. That eventuality is most certainly 
foreseeable. Yet, that circumstance will not constitute an 
"intervening cause" and therefore justify consideration of 
plaintiff's conduct in a strict liability action unless that 
conduct rises to such a level as to constitute assumption of 
the risk, misuse of the product, or highly reckless conduct. 
See Dillinger, supra. This is so even though plaintiff's 
conduct "set the events leading to the accident in motion." 
Thus, Judge Greenberg reads too much into the holding of 
Gallagher. Moreover, the discussion in Gallagher focused 
upon the reliability of the blood test, and the propriety of 
admitting evidence of intoxication in view of its propensity 
to generate bias. There is almost no discussion of the strict 
 
                                24 
liability and causation issue that we address here. The 
court's entire discussion of strict liability is at the very end 
of the opinion and is, in its entirety as follows: 
 
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in,. . . 
(3) allowing appellee's counsel after ruling that 
comparative negligence principles had no application, 
to suggest to the jury that the defendant's negligence 
was the sole cause of the accident. We have examined 
these contentions carefully and conclude that they 
have been adequately analyzed and properly decided by 
the trial judge. Suffice it to say that appellant's 
contentions are lacking in merit and do not warrant a 
new trial. 
 
532 A.2d at 1185. 
 
In summary, I believe Judge Cowen correctly summarizes 
the state of Pennsylvania law under § 402A of the 
Restatement. Evidence of the decedent's actions in the 
instant case is appropriate only if a jury determined that 
such actions were "not reasonably foreseeable or were 
otherwise extraordinary." Majority Op. at 16, (emphasis 
added). I do not feel that Judge Greenberg's analysis allows 
for any meaningful distinction between circumstances 
where plaintiff's conduct becomes relevant to causation, 
and those where it is precluded by policy considerations 
that drive the doctrine of strict liability as enunciated by 
the Pennsylvania courts. If the alleged defect was "a 
substantial factor in bringing about the harm," absent 
assumption of risk, misuse of product, or highly reckless 
conduct, it is irrelevant whether plaintiff's conduct set the 
events in motion or merely failed to prevent an injury, and 
I do not read our decision in Dillinger to the contrary. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Judge Cowen has written a thoughtful opinion in a 
difficult field of law, but I am forced to dissent because I 
interpret aspects of Pennsylvania products liability law 
fundamentally differently. I first will explain my view of the 
law and then explain my differences with the majority and 
the consequences stemming therefrom. 
 
I agree with much of the majority's analysis of 
Pennsylvania law, including its discussion of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's strong resistance to the 
inclusion of comparative fault principles in strict liability 
actions. I emphasize, however, that the Pennsylvania courts 
have been equally strong in maintaining the requirement 
that the plaintiff in a strict liability action bear the burden 
of showing both that the product was defective and that the 
defect proximately caused the injuries in question. See 
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 898 
(Pa. 1975) ("Neither can plaintiff recover by proving a defect 
in the product absent proof of causation, as where plaintiff 
sustains eye injury while not wearing defective safety 
glasses."); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 499 A.2d 326, 329 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (plaintiff must show defect was a 
"substantial factor in bringing about" injuries suffered); 
Sherk v. Daisy-Hedden, 450 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 1982) 
("Liability in ... strict liability is not imposed upon a 
manufacturer simply for the manufacture of a defective 
product."). 
 
Thus, evidence of the plaintiff's or a third party's 
conduct, whether negligent or not, is admissible to rebut 
the allegation that a defect actually caused the injury. 
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held 
that a plaintiff's or third party's conduct does not relieve 
the defendant of liability for a defect which was a 
substantial factor in bringing about the accident unless the 
conduct constituted a superseding or intervening cause of 
the injury. Thus, the defendant is liable as long as the 
defect was "a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm." Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. 1995), 
citing Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa. 
1981). Of course, for a superseding cause to relieve a 
defendant whose conduct has been determined to be a 
 
                                26 
substantial factor in causing the harm, it must be "so 
extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable." 
Powell, 653 A.2d at 623; Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton 
Corp., 319 A.2d 914, 920 (Pa. 1974). Accordingly, ordinary 
negligence will not do. The majority recognizes this point. 
See, e.g., Majority Op. at 7 ("[T]he plaintiff must show that: 
(1) a product defect (2) caused a harm (3) while the product 
was being used in a foreseeable manner."); Majority Op. at 
9 ("If foreseeable, the jury must find for the plaintiff unless 
it finds that the defect did not play even a substantial, or 
more than negligible, role in causing the plaintiff's injury."). 
 
Plainly, then, there is a distinction between a plaintiff's 
conduct which, rather than the defective product, was the 
cause of the injury and a plaintiff's conduct that was so 
extraordinary and unforeseeable that it was a superseding 
cause of the injury. Yet, if the injury is attributable to a 
plaintiff's conduct of either character, i.e., conduct that 
was the cause of the injury or unforeseeable superseding 
conduct, the defendant will not be liable even if its product 
was defective. An understanding of Pennsylvania product 
liability law requires that these concepts be kept separate 
so that a court understands the category into which the 
conduct fits when a defendant attempts to attribute the 
plaintiff's injury to his or her conduct. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken 
explicitly on the issue of how evidence of plaintiff and third- 
party conduct should be treated at trial, but the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court has addressed the issue in a 
number of cases. In Bascelli v. Randy, Inc., 488 A.2d 1110 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the Superior Court held that evidence 
of the plaintiff's negligent conduct in driving his motorcycle 
approximately 100 miles per hour at the time of the 
accident was admissible to show that the excessive speed, 
and not the alleged defect in the product, caused the 
accident. Id. at 1113. In Gallagher v. Ing, 532 A.2d 1179 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), the court approved the admission of 
evidence of the decedent's blood alcohol level "to show that 
the decedent was so intoxicated that he was incapable of 
driving safely" and that the intoxication, rather than a 
product defect, caused the accident. Id. at 1183. These 
cases illustrate the use of a plaintiff's conduct to 
 
                                27 
demonstrate that the injury cannot be attributed to a 
defective product. 
 
We considered how to treat a plaintiff's conduct in 
Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1992). In 
Dillinger, we refused to allow evidence of the plaintiff's 
contributory negligence because the evidence could show 
only that he failed to prevent an accident resulting from a 
sequence of events set into motion by a defect in the 
product. Id. at 442. Although in Dillinger we characterized 
the trend in the Pennsylvania Superior Court increasingly 
to inject negligence principles into strict liability actions as 
inconsistent with the rulings of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, we drew a clear distinction between evidence of 
conduct which caused an accident independently of the 
defect in the product and evidence of conduct which 
exacerbated or failed to prevent an injury caused by the 
defect. We explicitly held only the latter type of evidence 
inadmissible. Id. at 442, 444 n.23. Thus, we distinguished 
Bascelli and Gallagher as cases where the plaintiff's 
conduct set the events leading to the accident in motion. A 
number of district courts in this circuit have applied this 
approach. See, e.g., Ballarini v. Clark Equip. Co., 841 F. 
Supp. 662, 665 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1431 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (table); Kern v. Nissan Indust. Equip. Co., 801 F. 
Supp. 1438, 1441-43 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd , 16 F.3d 404 
(3d Cir. 1993) (table). 
 
A reading of Dillinger which requires the exclusion of all 
evidence of foreseeable conduct by the plaintiff relating to 
causation would violate the clear requirement of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that a plaintiff in a strict 
liability action must prove that the defect in the product 
caused the injuries. See Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 898. See 
also Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 840 F. Supp. 336, 338 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993) (holding that evidence of plaintiff's conduct is 
admissible to demonstrate that defect was not a cause of 
injury). After all, it hardly could be said that it is 
unforeseeable that a motorcycle driver will go at a high 
speed. Nevertheless, in Bascelli evidence of that speed was 
admissible to show that speed, rather than a product 
defect, caused the accident. Thus, Bascelli was not a 
superseding cause case. 
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It seems to me that the majority erroneously reads 
Dillinger to require the exclusion of all evidence of 
foreseeable conduct of a plaintiff relating to causation, for 
it indicates that the jury instruction was "fatally erroneous 
[because] it failed to require the jury to analyze whether Mr. 
Parks' actions were unforeseeable or extraordinary." 
Majority Op. at 18. The majority then indicates, erroneously 
in my view, that "[i]f the jury found that the actions were 
neither unforeseeable nor extraordinary, it could not have 
found his actions to be a `legal cause' of his injury." Id. The 
result the majority reaches does not take into account the 
distinction in Pennsylvania law between treatment of a 
plaintiff's negligence which is the sole cause of the injury 
and a plaintiff's negligence which combines with a defect in 
the product to cause the injury. Negligence of the second 
kind could defeat the claim only if so extraordinary as to be 
unforeseeable. 
 
I now consider the jury charge. The district court 
instructed the jury that there were four possible causes of 
the accident, the alleged defect in the product, Parks' 
conduct, his employer's conduct, and his co-worker's 
conduct, all of which could be legal causes of the accident. 
App. at 416-17. The court further instructed the jury that 
if it found a defect and that "the defect was a substantial 
factor in causing the harm, then your verdict will be for the 
plaintiff even if you find ... [that any other conduct] were 
legal causes of the accident because I already told you there 
may be more than one legal cause. . . . So, in order to find 
for the defendants, you must find that the alleged defect 
was not the legal cause of the accident." Id. at 417-19. 
 
I regard this charge as consistent with Pennsylvania law. 
The charge recognized that if a combination of a defect in 
the product and Parks' or another person's negligence 
caused the accident, the plaintiff would win. The majority 
makes much of the fact that the court used the phrase "the 
legal cause" rather than "a legal cause." Majority Op. at 17- 
18. While I agree that "a" is the proper article to use in this 
situation, I do not agree that this error so taints the charge 
as a whole that it could have misled the jury. The judge 
told the jury to consider the conduct only as it relates to 
the initial causation of the accident to evaluate which 
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events were substantial factors in bringing about the 
accident. Furthermore, the interrogatory to which the jury 
answered "No," thereby returning a verdict for the 
defendant, read as follows: "Was the defect in the excavator 
a substantial factor in bringing about Mr. Parks' death?" 
The jury of course, had the interrogatory when it 
deliberated and in these circumstances I cannot believe 
that the use of "the" rather than "a" in the charge mattered. 
 
In my view, the majority's holding that a foreseeability 
charge was required is fundamentally wrong because the 
plaintiff and third-party conduct was not presented to the 
jury as a superseding cause of the accident. Rather, the 
defense advanced that conduct as the sole cause of the 
accident. In a superseding cause situation, the defect is still 
a "but for" cause of the accident, or a substantial factor, 
but the superseding cause of the accident may excuse the 
defendant from liability if not reasonably foreseeable. Here, 
the court charged the jury to consider whether the alleged 
defect was a "substantial factor" in causing the accident 
and the jury found that it was not. It seems to me to be 
clear that when a court lays the precepts of Pennsylvania 
law against the charge, it should conclude that the charge 
did not include a reversible error. 
 
The main difference between my view and the majority's 
view, besides the result we reach, is the majority's holding 
that "the threshold question is whether the plaintiff's 
actions were foreseeable." Majority Op. at 9. I do not 
understand how it can make this statement, because it 
confuses substantial factor causation, i.e., the 
responsibility of the defendant in the first instance, with 
superseding causation. A superseding cause, if not 
reasonably foreseeable, breaks the chain of causation, but 
the jury must first find that there was a chain. The 
majority's holding eliminates this requirement and the 
majority says that "[c]ausation may be shown by process of 
elimination. . . ." Majority Op. at 10. The majority does not 
have case law to support this conclusion. The cases it cites 
deal with accidents where superseding causes exist after 
the defect first is found to be a substantial factor, e.g., 
Decorative Precast Stone Erectors, Inc. v. Buckrus-Erie Co., 
493 F. Supp. 555, 557 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd , 642 F.2d 441 
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(3d Cir. 1981) (table), where the plaintiff allegedly recklessly 
exposed himself to a defect, Childers v. Power Line Equip. 
Rentals, Inc., 681 A.2d 208-09 (Pa. 1996), where 
substantial change or misuse of a product is charged, Eck 
v. Powermatic Houdaille, 527 A.2d 1012, 1019 (Pa. 1987), 
or where the existence of a defect rather than causation is 
at issue, see Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259, 1262 (3d 
Cir. 1977). 
 
We face none of those situations in this case. The issue 
at trial here was whether the defect in the product was a 
substantial factor in causing the accident. The jury 
instructions correctly said that if it was the plaintiff must 
win. The jury found for the defendant by answering an 
interrogatory expressly finding that the defect was not a 
substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The 
majority will not allow a verdict based on the jury's answer 
to this interrogatory to stand because it holds that a 
foreseeable action by the plaintiff cannot be a "legal cause" 
of an accident. Majority Op. at 17-18. "Instead, it is 
removed from the picture, and liability attaches to the 
remaining causal actor or actors." Majority Op. at 12. I 
believe that this approach is simply wrong for it eliminates 
the jury's role in determining whether a defect is a 
substantial factor in an accident. It turns all cases 
involving causation into superseding cause cases in the 
sense that unless the plaintiff's or third party's conduct is 
not foreseeable, it cannot be the legal cause of the accident. 
As Bascelli, the 100 miles per hour motorcycle case, so 
clearly demonstrates, this is wrong. The majority opinion 
overlooks the fact that the jury first must find a chain of 
causation before considering whether a superseding cause 
breaks the chain. It assumes that a chain exists. 
 
Under the majority's view, a defendant could be found 
liable for a defect even if the defect did not contribute to the 
happening of the accident, because the majority removes 
from the case the possibility that foreseeable conduct of the 
plaintiff or a third party was the cause of the accident. It is 
important to remember that just because an accident is a 
type which a defect might cause does not mean that the 
defect necessarily did cause the accident. It is up to the 
jury to make this determination, not the court. Thus, I do 
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not believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would condone 
the result reached here. The majority's opinion will force 
the district court to try the case on the remand on incorrect 
principles of law and will require it to deliver an incorrect 
charge. 
 
In responding to my dissent in which I emphasize that 
the majority does not take into account the distinction 
between a plaintiff's negligence which is the sole cause of 
the injury and a plaintiff's conduct that was an 
unforseeable superseding intervening cause of the injury, 
the majority sets forth the following: 
 
 The instant case is precisely of the second type: the 
jury explicitly answered yes to the question, `Was the 
Gradall excavator defective at the time it was 
manufactured and sold?' App. at 432. The machine's 
defect was impaired visibility of precisely the area in 
which the accident occurred. In accordance with the 
dissent's above description, the manufacturer of the 
defective product should be held liable unless the 
plaintiff's actions were unforseeable. 
 
Majority Op. at 9-10 n.3. 
 
I deduce from the foregoing analysis that the majority, 
sitting as a court of appeals, must be determining as a 
matter of law that the nature of the defect meant it had to 
be a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. I 
cannot understand how the majority can make this 
determination because it is deciding the proximate cause 
issue and deciding it contrary to the jury which expressly 
answered "no" to the following question: "Was the defect in 
the excavator a substantial factor in bringing about Mr. 
Parks' death?" The fact that the machine had impaired 
visibility no doubt led the jury to find that it was defective. 
Yet that finding simply did not determine that the defect 
was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. 
Thus, just as I have indicated already, the majority turns 
all cases involving causation when a plaintiff's or third 
party's conduct is involved into superseding cause cases so 
that unless the plaintiff's or third party's conduct is 
unforeseeable, it cannot be the legal cause of the accident. 
 
                                32 
As far as I am concerned this appeal is being decided 
incorrectly which in itself is unfortunate. But the 
consequences of the majority opinion go beyond this case. 
There are many diversity of citizenship products liability 
cases under Pennsylvania law tried in this circuit. From the 
time of the publication of the opinion in this case the 
district courts will be confronted with following 
Pennsylvania law, as announced by the Pennsylvania 
courts and permit the jury to conclude that a plaintiff's or 
third party's conduct, even if foreseeable, can be the sole 
proximate cause of an injury, or following the majority's 
opinion which makes clear that the injury can be attributed 
to plaintiff's or third party's conduct only if that conduct is 
not foreseeable. I presume that the district courts will 
follow the majority's opinion here and thus the outcome of 
a case may be determined on whether it is tried in the state 
or federal court. This is serious business. 
 
Judge McKee's concurrence misinterprets the holding I 
suggest would be appropriate here and thus it does not 
persuade me that my views are wrong. I do not believe, as 
Judge McKee suggests I do, Concurrence at 20-21, that a 
plaintiff's conduct can be used to relieve a defendant of 
liability merely because it contributed to an accident 
caused by a defect. In fact, I believe the opposite to be true. 
Yet, a jury must determine whether the defect is actually a 
substantial factor in causing the accident and thus must 
consider what else, including a plaintiff's conduct, could 
have caused the accident without contribution from the 
defect. Thus, I agree with Judge McKee when he states: 
" `[i]f the alleged defect was a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm,' absent assumption of risk, misuse of 
product, or highly reckless conduct, it is irrelevant whether 
plaintiff's conduct set the events in motion or merely failed 
to prevent an injury . . . ." Concurrence at 25. 
Unfortunately, however, the result being reached here will 
not allow the jury to decide whether the defect is "a 
substantial factor in bringing about the harm." 
 
Indeed, Judge McKee's explanation of Judge Cowen's 
opinion effectively admits this point because, quoting Judge 
Cowen, he indicates that "[e]vidence of the decedent's 
actions in the instant case is appropriate only if a jury 
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determined that such actions were `not reasonably 
foreseeable or were otherwise extraordinary.' " Concurrence 
at 25. This statement simply cannot be correct because it 
removes from the jury the opportunity to consider whether 
the defect was "a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm." A plaintiff's unexceptionable conduct may cause a 
plaintiff using a defective product to be injured without the 
defect in the product contributing to the injury. For 
example, a car might be delivered with defective brakes but 
if a plaintiff driving the car who is about to get into an 
accident, whether or not he is negligent, does not use the 
brakes, then the defect simply is not a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm even if the brakes would not have 
worked if the plaintiff had applied them. In such a case the 
defendant should be able to establish that the defective 
brakes had nothing to do with the accident and the 
defendant should win in a products liability case. See 
Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 901 ("Whether decident actually 
attempted autorotation is relevant to the issue of causation. 
If the jury were to conclude, for example, that a non- 
defective system would allow two seconds for autorotation 
and that the decedent did not attempt autorotation for 
three seconds; even if a defect was shown, it would not 
have been the proximate cause of the crush."). 
 
The fact in my brakes example that the plaintiff might 
have been negligent is immaterial and thus if the plaintiff 
was negligent his negligence would not bar his claim. 
Rather, he would lose because the defect was not a 
substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The 
district court properly tried the case applying these 
principles which Pennsylvania law (and probably the law 
through the United States) establishes, and thus we should 
affirm. 
 
In the circumstances I am constrained to dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
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Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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